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This  paper  provides  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  demand  for  financial  services  by  micro-
entrepreneurs operating in urban African markets. It particularly seeks to identify the motivations 
behind the use  of the so-called informal  financial practices  in an environment where formal 
financial markets are active. The evidence provided in this paper is in sharp contradiction with 
the idea that that participation to informal finance is solely triggered by the lack of access to 
formal  financial  market.  Using  a  first-hand  dataset  collected  in  three  markets  located  in 
Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso (West Africa), this paper shows that the use of 
some financial devices is, to some extent, dependent on motivations that are not financial in 
nature such as the need to create or enhance social relations.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The economic literature, particularly in the field of development economics, tends to associate 
participation  to  informal  financial  markets  with  the  lack  or  weak  access  to  formal  financial 
markets (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993). This long lasting idea has its roots in two main theoretical 
arguments. The first argument draws from the financial repression theory (McKinnon, 1973, 
1976 and Shaw, 1973) which views informal financial markets as a result of State intervention in 
financial markets through a set of regulations, laws, as well as non-market restrictions.
1  Financial 
repression  policies  such  as  interest  rate  ceilings,  high  liquidity  ratio  requirements,  high  bank 
reserve  requirements,  capital  controls,  restrictions  on  market  entry  into  the  financial  sector, 
credits controls as well as and nationalization of banks (government ownership or domination of 
banks). All these policies result in an inefficient allocation of capital as they discourage savings 
while reducing the supply of credit by banks. Hence, it prevents some people from accessing 
credit, even though without these restrictions, they would qualify for obtaining bank loans. The 
resulting unsatisfied demand for loans is absorbed by the unorganized informal money market 
which acts as a residual market such as to allow financial markets to clear (Van Wijnbergen, 
1983). Ultimately, financial repression affects adversely economic growth due to its inefficient 
resources allocation. 
 
The second theoretical argument draws from the theory of information asymmetries developed 
by Stiglitz and Weis (1981). While the financial repression theory insists on the exogenous origin of 
credit restrictions and puts the blame on State interventions, Stiglitz and Weiss point the finger to 
endogenous markets failures. In their influential paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how – in a 
context of limited liability
2- information asymmetries between the borrower and the lender can 
lead to credit rationing. Their argument can be briefly put as follows: when banks have limited 
information  on  their  borrowers,  they  are  not  able  to  distinguish  between  safe  and  risky 
borrowers. Hence, they have to rely heavily on collaterals and those without sufficient collaterals 
are excluded from the credit market or quantity rationed. 
 
                                                
1 The rationale of financial repression lies in the fact that, by controlling the financial sector, the Government has 
access to  cheap  resources.  Indeed,  financial  repression constitutes an implicit  fiscal policy  as a  system  of high 
liquidity ratios (or high bank reserves), the increases the base money and thereby, seigniorage revenue. In the same 
way, interest rate ceiling help reducing the fiscal burden for highly indebted Government while direct control of 
credit allocation allows Government to ensure stable provision of capital to strategic economic sectors.  
2 Limited liability implies that the borrower bears no responsibility to pay out of his pocket in case the returns 
generated by his project are not enough to meet his debt obligations.  
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Finally, both the financial repression and the information asymmetry arguments focus exclusively 
on  the  behavior  of  the  suppliers of  financial  services  in  the  presence  of  either  Government 
restrictions or markets imperfections.  The demand for informal finance is not dealt with directly. 
Instead, it is seen as a shadow of the unsatisfied demand in the formal market. Nevertheless, 
these two arguments have had significant influence on the subsequent analysis of the so-called 
informal financial practices. This is notably the case for studies dedicated to the rationale of 
participation  to informal  financial  associations known  as Roscas  where  it is  the implicitly or 
explicitly assumed that those participating to Roscas have no access to other saving techniques 
(Besley, Coate and Loury, 1993, Anderson and Baland, 2002, Gugerty, 2006).
3  
 
However, the view that those participating to informal finance are necessarily quantity rationed 
does not resist empirical evidence as recent field studies have revealed that some individuals 
having access to formal markets continue to be active in informal markets. Such cases have been 
identified, among others, in Zimbabwe where 77% of market traders who participate in Rosca 
had also a bank account as reported by Chamlee-Wright (2002). A more recent study carried in 
Bangladesh, India, and South Africa, Collins, Morduch, Rutherford and Ruthven (2009) revealed 
that  low  Income  people  use  a  mixture  of  informal  and  formal  financial  devices  in  order  to 
manage their daily budget. The objective of this paper consists in a meticulous check up of the 
motivations behind the use of financial practices in an environment where both informal and 
formal financial practices coexist so as to shed light on the rationale of such coexistence.  
 
The  remaining  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows;  the  next  section  attempts  to  outline  a 
framework for analyzing the demand of informal finance and discusses the usefulness of the 
concept  of  reciprocity  for  this  framework.    The  third  section  provides  a  discussion  of  the 
empirical strategy and provides some descriptive statistics while the last section concludes.  
 
2.  A framework for analyzing the demand for informal financial services 
 
As  mentioned above, economic models analyzing the demand of informal  finance invariably 
make the assumption that participation to informal financial markets is mainly triggered by “the 
lack or weak access to formal financial markets” or in other words by “financial exclusion”. Such 
an assumption excludes, a priori, the possibility of a deliberate decision to join the so-called 
                                                
3 Roscas are informal associations whereby individuals agree to meet on a regular basis and convene to contribute a 
given sum of money to a common pot. This pot is allocated to one of them each time they meet and whoever 
receives the pot is excluded from receiving it again before each member has had his turn (Anderson & Baland, 2002).   
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informal  financial  practices.  However;  some  authors  challenged  the  financial  exclusion 
assumption by suggesting that informal finance can sometimes be the optimal choice even for 
individuals with access to formal markets. Some of the explanations put forward by these authors 
include the fact that transactions costs are, sometimes, lower in informal financial markets than in 
formal markets (Kochar, 1992, Chung, 1992, Barham et al. 1996 and Mushinski, 1999). Another 
explanation is that the contracts offered by informal finance are, in some instances, less risky than 
those in formal markets (Boucher & Guirkinger, 2004, Boucher, Carter, & Guirkinger, 2005, 
Guirkinger,  2006).    The  models  developed  by  these  do  not  make  the  financial  exclusion 
assumption and show how factors such as transactions costs and risk-sharing rules affect the 
demand for informal loans. 
 
This paper endeavors to go a step further by considering a broader range of motives behind the 
use  of  financial  practice.  An  important  focus  is  put  on  motivations  that  are  not  necessarily 
financial in nature such as motives related to social relations. Indeed, some scholars such as 
Guérin  et  al  (2010)  argue  that  “social motives play a non-negligible role in explaining the persistence of 
informal  financial  practices”.  From  a  theoretical  perspective,  the  effect  of  social  relations  on 
economic outcomes can be traced back to the concepts of “social embeddedness” and “reciprocity” 
that were first coined by Polanyi (1944) in his famous book “the Great transformation”.
4  While 
the concept of embeddedness refers to “the extent to which economic action is linked to or depends on 
action or institutions which are non-economic in content, goals or processes” (Granovetter, 2005), the concept 
of reciprocity could be defined as a mechanism of gift exchange with the objective of enhancing 
their social relations. The concept of reciprocity is briefly discussed in the next section 
 
i.  The reciprocity principle: a fruitful concept 
 
In the Great Transformation and in his subsequent publications, Polanyi did not consider the 
price-making market as the sole and natural form of economic integration.
5 He identified two other 
forms of economic integration or institutionalized processes of production and exchange which 
are (1) the Reciprocity and (2) the Redistribution systems of economic integration.
6  
                                                
4 The Great Transformation is basically a historical analysis of the transformation through which went the western 
economies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It is the history of the emergence, the blossoming 
and the demise of the self regulating market (Anne Mayhew, 2000). 
5 The “form of economic integration” refers the entire process/system that allows the occurrence of human interactions 
(exchanges) and gives to these interactions the required stability to sustain. 
6 Polanyi identified a fourth form of economic integration which is namely the household administration whereby 
the production takes place within the household and for the household. However, later on he considered this form 
of economic integration as a particular case of redistribution that is organized at the household level.   
  4 
 
Under the market principle, the production and the coordination of exchanges are based on a 
price mechanism whereby prices are freely determined by market forces. In such a mechanism the 
price is expected to reflect the value of the good or the service being exchanged. It is the rule of 
cost equivalence.
7  The logic behind market exchanges is that of anonymity as individuals are assumed 
to be identical in all respects. Hence, the interdependence between individuals on the market is of 
a mechanical nature. Under the redistribution principle, the exchanges rely on a mechanism which 
requires the existence of both a Central authority and a set of rules or laws allowing the central 
authority to collect and redistribute resources. The logic at work is that of centricity or protection and 
the interdependence between individuals is of a legal nature.
  
 
Contrary to the market and redistribution principles, the mechanism underlying the principle of 
reciprocity is based on symmetric social relations of kin and/or community.  The logic at work is that of 
symmetry while the interdependence between individuals is constructed on a voluntary basis (Servet, 
2007).
 Concretely, a system of economic exchanges based on a mechanism of reciprocity displays 
three main features as described below.  
 
First, the reciprocity principle entails at least two of the three stages of the famous Potlatch 
triadic cycle – give, receive and give back – as explained by Mauss (1925) in the gift paradigm.  This 
cycle is based on symmetrical relations of gift and counter gift. However, while the rule of cost 
equivalence  prevails  on  the  market,  the  gifts  exchanged  under  the  reciprocity  principle  may 
happen to be of totally different values. In some instances, the counter gift – in the form of a 
foreseeable physical benefit for the gift giver – may even not be expected in which case the gift 
process reduces to two stages: giving and receiving.
8 Second, under the reciprocity principle there 
is no price mechanism based on the cost equivalence rule as this is the case for the market 
principle. This second feature follows directly from the previous since the counter gift does not 
need to reflect the value of the initial gift.  Third, under the reciprocity mechanism, exchanges are 
not only intended to allow the transfer of goods and services but also to create or enhance the 
social ties between the stakeholders. It may even be the case that a gift exchange under the 
reciprocity principle is solely intended to create or consolidate social relations. As highlighted by 
                                                
7 The cost-equivalence rule stems from the fact that on competitive markets the cost of production equals the price 
of output, provided that a rate of return on investment is included in cost. As Bell (1991) puts it: “in neoclassical ethics, 
prices that exceed cost are unfair to consumers and imply the exploitation of monopolistic advantage, while prices that are below cost are 
unfair and may represent unfair competition – in the form of a – dumping” 
8 Note that the forms taken by gifts can range from material objects such as physical goods or services to immaterial 
objects such as social recognition.  
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Servet (2007) reciprocity mechanisms are embedded in broad relationship schemes where the 
stakeholders convene implicitly or explicitly to take part in a relationship of complementarity and 
voluntary interdependence. Note that it does not matter whether the need to create or enhance 
social relations is driven by the search of personal benefit, by kindness or even imposed by some 
social norms.
9   
 
ii.  Reciprocity and the demand for informal finance 
 
Considering  that  some  informal  financial  practices  are  highly  embedded  in  a  reciprocity 
mechanism and as such have a high potential of generating or enhancing social relations, it is 
quite important to account for the effect of such social relations while analyzing the determinants 
of the financial behavior of individuals involved in those practices. This is the case for practices 
such as Roscas and loans between friends which are characterized by their extreme reliance on 
social relations. These financial practices take place between friends and acquaintances. They can 
also  occur  between  friends  or  acquaintances  of  friends  as  well.  Indeed,  this  chain  of  social 
relationships allows the blossoming and the rooting of the confidence between individuals who 
decide to get into financial transactions. Moreover, such practices constitute place where new 
social relations are forged and existing networks expanded or consolidated.  
 
At the end, one can identify two channels through which social relations affect the decision to 
join a financial practice embedded in a reciprocity mechanism. On the one hand, the decision to 
join a financial practice that is embedded in a reciprocity mechanism can be motivated by the 
opportunity offered by such a practice for creating new or consolidating existing social relations. 
On the other hand, the fact that existing social relations act as a source of confidence between 
individuals taking part to a financial transaction cannot be underplayed. In fact, participation to 
practices  such  as  Roscas  is  likely  to  depend  on  the  social  proximity  of  the  members.  As 
mentioned earlier, social proximity is a source of information on the other members and, as such, 
it acts as a social collateral ensuring the success of the financial transaction (Besley and Coate, 
1995). However, both channels often act simultaneously making it rather difficult to disentangle 
them. 
 
                                                
9 Polanyi and his disciples were criticized for allegedly assuming the forms of economic integration to be founded on 
different human motives whereby reciprocity would be correlated with kindness while the market would be driven 
by greed and rational calculation. However, this critic was actually taken into account by Polanyi who was “careful to 
note that the range of human motives varies little across systems…” (Mayhew, 1994)  
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Hence the following conjuncture:  
 
Conjuncture:  Social  relations  play  an  important  role  in  the  decision  to  enroll  in  informal  financial 
practices that are obviously embedded in a reciprocity mechanism. 
 
Corollary: One of the implications of this conjuncture is that even in the absence of any sort of financial 
rationing (exclusion), an individual may still find it optimal to resort informal financial instruments. 
 
iii.  Important remarks about social relations 
 
Before considering some empirical results, let us mention two important remarks about social 
relations. On the one hand, the definition of the concept of social relations used in this paper 
follows from Grossetti (2009) who identified three minimal conditions for a social relation to be 
valid. First, individuals into a social relationship are expected to know each other i.e. to have 
information about each other and are expected to adjust their behavior accordingly. Second, they must 
accept a mutual commitment to enter into co-operative (non-conflictual) interactions. Third, their 
interactions lead to specific forms of trust. These relations exclude occasional and transient business 
interactions.  
 
On the other hand, it is important to note that the commitment of the stakeholders to a social 
relation is reflected through the obligations and rights generated by such a social relation. Indeed, 
social relations can be analyzed as a set of rights and obligations individuals have vis-à-vis their 
friends  and  acquaintances.  Therefore,  the  desire  to  join  a  financial  practice  embedded  in  a 
mechanism of reciprocity will depend on the perceived importance or weight of rights and/or 
obligations generated by social relations arising from such a mechanism.  
 
3.  Empirical evidence 
 
This section presents descriptive statistics highlighting the importance for social relations in the 
decision to adhere to informal financial practices that are embedded, albeit to different degrees, 
in a reciprocity mechanism. Such statistics allows shedding some light to the rationale behind the 
demand for financial services. In total, six financial practices were identified. They include formal 
practices  such  as  traditional  banks,  Microfinance  institutions  (mainly  credit  and  saving 
cooperatives) as well as informal practices such as Roscas called Pari, moving bankers known as  
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Cauri d’or
10, commercial advances or supplier credits – the most popular supplier credit is the 
taraogo
11 – as well as loans between friends.  
 
i.  Sample and data  
 
A random sample of 398 micro-entrepreneurs was selected from the markets of Nabi Yaar, Rood 
Woko and Dasasgho located in Ouagadougou, the Capital City of Burkina. The total population 
in  these  markets  amounted  to  about  6,500  micro-entrepreneurs.  The  selected  micro-
entrepreneurs were submitted to a detailed survey containing among others a module designed to 
collect information about the participation of the respondents to the various financial practices as 
well as module made of qualitative questions aimed at identifying the reasons behind the decision 
to use each of the identified financial practice. The methodology adopted in this module consists 
in  asking  directly  the  respondents  to  give  reasons  behind  their  decision  to  use  a  particular 
financial practice such as to identify a number of motives that could explain their behavior. A 
particular attention is devoted to motives that are related to social relations.   
.   
ii.  Financial participation 
 
During the survey, micro-entrepreneurs were asked to indicate all the financial practices they ever 
used including those they were no more using. This information was useful in assessing financial 
participation through the analysis of the global enrollment rates; the drop out rates as well as the 
actual enrollment rates (see figures 1 & 2): 
· · · ·  The global enrollment rate indicates the proportion of respondents who declare to have used a 
particular financial practice even though this may no longer be the case. 
· · · ·  The actual enrollment rate indicates the actual proportion of respondents who are still using a 
particular financial practice.  
                                                
10 The cauri d’or is a financial practice by which an individual called “tontinier” takes the responsibility of collecting 
and keeping the savings of several other people. Each member of the cauri d’or decides to save a given amount of 
money every day. The collected amount is recorded in notebook (diary) left at the disposal of the member 
11 Taraogo is a sort of purchase credit whereby the micro-entrepreneur is supplied by a colleague or a wholesaler and  
he accepts to pay a fix amount every day until he pays back the entire amount of the credit  
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From figure 1, it appears that Supplier credits constitute the most popular financial practice with 
global and current enrollment rates of about 63% (actual 63%) each. The next practice is the 
Cauris d’or with a global enrollment rate of 56% (actual 44%).  Both Roscas Pari and Loans 
between  friends  account  for  less  than  30%  each.  Considering  formal  financial  practices,  we 
observe that cooperatives are the most popular with a global enrollment rate of about 41% actual 
(34) while traditional banks’ enrollment rate is only of 24% (actual 20%). Finally, only 6% of the 
respondents have never used any of the identified financial practices. At the time of survey 10% 
of the respondents were not engaged in any financial practice. 
 
The  next  figure  (figure  2)  shows  that  about  50%  (actual:  41%)  of  the  interviewed  micro-
entrepreneurs are active in both formal informal financial markets. This finding is in line with 
Morvant-Roux (2009) and Guérin et al (2010) who showed that the access to formal microcredit 
does not prevent individuals from using informal loans.  However, while these findings relate 
exclusively to the use of informal credit in rural areas, the finding presented in this study is not 
restricted neither to credit markets and applies to urban areas. It shows clearly that a significant 
number of micro-entrepreneurs operating in the city of Ouagadougou juggle both formal and 
informal  financial  instruments  in  order  to  meet  their  financial  (saving  and  credit)  needs.  It 
constitutes an additional empirical evidence against the idea that participation to informal finance 
is triggered by the lack of access to formal financial markets.   
  9 
 
iii.  The importance of social related motives 
 
Figure 3 depicts the proportion of micro-entrepreneurs who declared that social relations have 
played an important role in their decision to enroll in the identified financial practice. It appears 
clearly that this proportion is more important for informal financial practice than for formal 
financial practices. This suggests that the impact of social relations is likely to be more important 
in informal financial practices.  
 
Roscas (Pari) are more prone to rely on social relations i.e. individuals accept to join Roscas when 
they  know  the  other  prospective  members.  As  such,  individuals  joining  Roscas  have  the 
opportunity of enhancing their existing social relations but at the same time these social relations 
constitute a source of confidence about the reliability of the other members. In the same vein, 
involvement in loans between friends is more likely to be triggered by the need to maintain 
(enhance) good relationship with friends.    
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4.  Concluding remarks 
 
Given the above results, it appears that social relations are likely to be operational in explaining 
financial  behavior  of  micro-entrepreneurs  operating  in  urban  sub-Saharan  African  markets. 
Particularly, micro-entrepreneurs participating in informal financial practice such as Roscas, Cauri 
d’or and loans between friends seem to be more inclined to take their decisions for reasons 
related to social relations. This suggests clearly that social relations constitute a non negligible 
motive  for  participating  to  specific  informal  financial  practices.  A  direct  implication  of  this 
finding  is  that  such  informal  financial  practices  will  tend  to  persist  even  if  formal  financial 
practices are available and accessible. However, this hypothesis needs to be confirmed through a 
detailed econometric analysis which allows controlling for a number of variables susceptible of 
affecting individuals’ financial behavior.  . 
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